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What the Future ‘Might’ Brings
David Boylan∗
It is easy to talk about what we know right now, what we knew yesterday and what
we will come to know tomorrow. We can also talk about what might be now and
what might have been the case yesterday. But what about what might be tomorrow?
I argue that we can indeed talk coherently about future epistemic possibilities, but
not as we might have expected. In cases where information is lost, they cannot
simply be used to talk about our future evidence. In light of this, I argue we need a
new theory of the domains of quantification for epistemic modals.
Epistemic modals are often thought of as tools for describing a given body of
evidence. Specifically, a sentence like
(1) It might be raining.
means roughly
(2) The current evidence doesn’t rule out that it is raining.
Most theories of epistemic modals formalize this thought as follows:1
Evidence: Jmight φKc,w,t = 1 iff φ is compatible with the evidence of
the relevant agent(s) in c in w at t.
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1Something like this view originates in Moore (1962) and can be traced through Hacking (1967),
Teller (1972), DeRose (1991) and Kratzer (1981).
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Theories differ over whose evidence is relevant. But they agree on the central point:
what is epistemically possible at a given time is whatever is compatible with the
evidence of a certain set of agents at that time.
I test the predictions of Evidence against cases of predictable forgetting. In
such cases, speakers cannot describe their future states of mind with epistemic
modals under future tense even though they know that they will be able to do so.
Moreover, no similar barrier exists for past epistemic modal claims. Evidence can’t
predict these data.
I propose replacing Evidence with History:
History. ⌜might φ⌝ is true at a world w and time t iff φ is compatible
with the evidence in the relevant interval before and up to t.
According to History, epistemic modals collect information that agents gather over
time, not just their evidence at a particular time. This makes epistemic modals sen-
sitive to evidence agents used to have, as well as evidence they have now. Epistemic
modals never lose information: once something becomes necessary, it remains nec-
essary. They are tools to describe information obtained over time in abstraction
from the deficiencies of the agents who gather it.
1 Predictable Forgetting
An agent predictably forgets some proposition p just in case she knows p at some
time t and knows that she will forget p by some later time t′.
Predictable forgetting is not uncommon. I can predict that I will forget that the
person I just met is called John, that John lives in Apartment 211, that his phone
number is such and such. The structure of my cases will be somewhat more in-
volved. But we do well to remember that the basic phenomenon is pervasive.
Here’s an example.
Keys on Monday. On Monday night, Alice leaves her keys in the
kitchen. But she always forgets where she has left the keys overnight.
She foresees that tomorrow morning she will look for them in her bed-
room.
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What kinds of epistemic modal claims can Alice make? Three observations.
First, Alice cannot report her future ignorance by saying:
(3) # Tomorrow my bedroom will be one of the places that the keys might be
in.
(4) # Tomorrow my keys might be in the bedroom.
(5) # Tomorrow it will be possible that the keys are on the nightstand.
(6) # Tomorrow I’ll look in my bedroom because the keys might be on the night-
stand.
(7) # Tomorrow I’ll look in my bedroom because it will be possible that the keys
are on the nightstand.
(8) # Tomorrow I will search every drawer in my room which might contain the
keys.
These sentences should have true readings where the tense scopes over the modal.
Nevertheless, they sound marked. Observation 1 sums this up:
Observation 1. Whenever a speaker knows that φ, they cannot assert⌜FUT might ¬φ⌝, even if they know they will no longer know φ at some
later time.2
What can Alice’s future, less informed self say? Consider
Keys on Tuesday Alice wakes up Tuesday and has forgotten where the
keys are. She looks for them upstairs.
2This markedness also projects under supposition. Imagine Alice supposes the scenario above
held. The following is then true:
(i) Alice supposes that she knows the keys are not in her bedroom, but that she will forget this.
Can she suppose that it will in the future be possible that they are somewhere else? It seems not.
Consider:
(ii) Alice supposes that she will search every drawer in her room which might contain the keys.
Now Alice seems to be contradicting her initial supposition.
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Alice says
(9) The keys might be on the nightstand.
What Alice says is perfectly assertable; she’s not making some mistake in uttering
this sentence. In Alice’s situation, you might say something like (9), too. This
pattern is general and gives us our second observation:
Observation 2. At the later time when the speaker has forgotten φ, she
may assert ⌜might ¬φ⌝.
Finally, consider what Alice can say about her past self. As von Fintel and
Gillies (2008) note, agents can use past ‘might’-claims to talk about times when
they had less knowledge. Continue the case:
Keys on Monday Again. On Monday night Alice’s partner asks her
what she was doing rummaging around in their bedroom on Sunday
morning. Alice was in fact looking for the keys, which her partner had
placed in the living room.
Imagine Alice replies
(10) Yesterday I was searching our bedroom because the keys might have been
in there. (It turned out they were in the living room.)
(11) Yesterday I was searching every drawer that the keys might have been in.
Strikingly, this is perfectly natural, even though Alice knows that the keys were not
in the bedroom. Thus:
Observation 3. If they know they previously did not know φ, even a
speaker who currently knows that φ can assert ⌜PAST might ¬φ⌝.
There are two surprises here. First is the combination of Observations 1 and 2.
In these cases, why is there a difference between what I will be able to say about
myself using an epistemic modal and what I can now say about my future self?
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This is not how things usually go. If I foresee that tomorrow I will correctly say
‘It is raining in Topeka’ then it should be correct for me now to say ‘It will rain in
Topeka’. Why are epistemic modals different?
The second surprise is the combination of Observations 1 and 3. They show that
there is an asymmetry between past- and future-tensed epistemic modals. Present
information that φ interferes with our assessment of ⌜FUT might ¬φ⌝ but not⌜PAST might ¬φ⌝ . Why does the direction in time matter?
2 What Evidence Predicts
We will now make precise why predictable forgetting is a challenge for Evidence.
To make Evidence precise, we will use a broadly Kratzerian account, which
posits a modal base, Bc, a contextually-supplied function from a world and a time
to a set of propositions. The modal quantifies over the intersection of Bc(w, t).3
(12) Jmight φKc,w,t = 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ ⋂Bc(w, t) ∶ JφKc,w′t = 1
We treat tenses as operators, shifting the time of evaluation:
(13) JPAST φKc,w,t = 1 iff ∃t′ ∶ t′ < t ∧ JφKc,w,t′ = 1
(14) JFUT φKc,w,t = 1 iff ∃t′ ∶ t < t′ ∧ JφKc,w,t′ = 1
where t < t′ just in case t is earlier than t′. 4
Combining these assumptions yields this schematic entry for future ‘might’-
claims:
(15) JFUT might φKc,w,t = 1 iff ∃t′ ∶ t < t′ ∶ ∃w′ ∈ ⋂Bc(w, t′) ∶ JφKc,w′,t′ = 1
⌜FUT might φ⌝ is true at time t iff there is a φ-world in the modal base as evaluated
at some point later than t. Similarly, for past ‘might’-claims:
3This is von Fintel and Gillies (2008)’s formulation, which adds a time-parameter to Kratzer
(1977), Kratzer (1981) and Kratzer (1991).
4We could equally well use a referential theory of tense, as in Partee (1973) or Abusch (1997), or
a modal theory of ‘will’, as in Enc (1985), Abusch (1997) and Cariani and Santorio (forthcoming).
(See Ogihara (2007) for more on these issues.)
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(16) JPAST might φKc,w,t = 1 iff ∃t′ ∶ t′ < t ∶ ∃w′ ∈ ⋂Bc(w′, t′) ∶ JφKc,w′,t′ = 1.
⌜PAST might φ⌝ is true at a time t just in case there is a φ-world in the modal base
as evaluated at some point earlier than t.
Start with solipsistic contextualism, according to which the modal talks about
the speaker’s evidence. More specifically, when given a world w and a time t, Bc
outputs the set of propositions that make up the speaker’s evidence in w at t. In
Keys, Alice’s only evidence about the keys is what she remembers about their loca-
tion, so Alice’s evidence and her knowledge are interchangeable here. So Bc(w, t)
is the set of propositions that Alice knows in w at t.
This semantics fails to predict Observation 1. We said Alice will forget the
location of the keys. So when (3) – (8) are read as future ‘might’-claims, they are
predicted true. And Alice knows this. She should be able to tell that (3)-(8) are true.
Evidence predicts that (3) - (8) should be sensible things for Alice to say.
I have focused on solipsistic contextualism, a theory thoroughly undermined by
MacFarlane (2011)’s problem of disagreement. Nevertheless, proposals for treating
disagreement do not help.
Take Dowell (2011)’s proposal: the speaker can select whatever modal base
she likes, so long as she can reasonably expect her audience to figure out what she
means. In predictable forgetting cases, it would be reasonable to take the relevant
knowledge to be the speaker’s. This interpretation makes (3) - (8) true and relevant.
This view won’t rule out the problematic readings of (3)–(8); it just adds possible
readings. This problem generalizes to other sophisticated contextualisms.5
What about relativism? Relativists add a parameter to the index—a context of
assessment parameter. It supplies the relevant knowledge. Where Ba is the set of
propositions known by the assessor in w at t, we have:
(17) Jmight φKc,w,t,a = 1 iff ∃w′ ∈ ⋂Ba(w, t) ∶ JφKc,w′,t,a = 16
⌜might φ⌝ is true at ⟨c,w, t, a⟩ just in case the the assessor’s evidence in a at t is
consistent with φ.
5For instance, von Fintel and Gillies (2011)’s cloudy contextualism faces the same issue.
6I add a time parameter to MacFarlane (2011).
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What does relativism predict about ⌜FUT might φ⌝ in Keys? That depends on
what the assessors will know the next day. Plausibly, we expect our current knowl-
edge to persist through Tuesday, so relativism predicts the ⌜FUT might φ⌝ examples
are false in our context of assessment: since we won’t forget ¬φ, ⌜might φ⌝ will be
false when fed times from Tuesday. But then ⌜might φ⌝ is false as said on Tuesday
too: the same information is used to assess it. Relativism wrongly predicts ⌜might
φ⌝ as said on Tuesday should sound just as bad to us as ⌜FUT might φ⌝ as said on
Monday.7
The problem is clear. Evidence can’t predict both Observations 1 and 2. It
seems to make the ‘might’ claim made in the future true only if it makes the fu-
ture tensed ‘might’ claim made in the present true, too. Likewise, Evidence can’t
predict both Observation 1 and 3. According to Evidence, modals simply track the
evolution of some body of information: present information is irrelevant in the past
and the future.
3 Tensing Modals
We’ve assumed that tense can scope over epistemic modals. Some, like Groenendijk
and Stokhof (1975), Iatridou (1990) and Hacquard (2006), reject this assumption.
I argue that they are mistaken. There are examples of past- and future-shifted epis-
temic modals.
3.1 Evidence of Shifting
To be sure, epistemic modals at least seem to have tensed readings.
As noted in Observation 3, epistemic modals have backwards-shifted readings:
past ‘might’s there are felicitous. We also find forward-shifted readings. Consider
this case:8
Shortlist. You and I are trying to figure out who got the job at our
university. We don’t know very much about who the candidates might
7Stephenson (2007) and Egan (2007) face the same problem.
8Dorr and Hawthorne (2013) discuss a similar case.
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be, but we know we will see the shortlist tomorrow. We will contact
everyone on the shortlist to see if they got the job.
You say to me:
(18) Let’s drop this matter for now. Tomorrow we will contact everyone who
might have been hired.
(19) Tomorrow we will contact every possible hire.
These sentences aren’t about who might have been hired given our current evidence,
but about who might have been hired given our future evidence. Suppose today we
think John might have been hired, but tomorrow we discover he wasn’t. If we didn’t
contact John, it would be bizarre for me to claim that you are not following up on
what you said in (18) or (19). This is because you were talking about your future
evidence, not your evidence at the time of utterance.
This is an important point. We can’t explain the badness of future ‘might’-
sentences (3)-(8) by denying that forward-shifting is possible. This makes our situa-
tion much more puzzling. If future shifted readings exist, why are they not available
in Keys?
3.2 Explaining away shifting
Some claim that past-shifting is merely apparent. Can we say the same about future-
shifting? One thought is that the examples from the last section involve an elided
attitude ascription. When we hear sentences like
(20) The keys might have been in the drawer.
(21) We will interview everyone who might have gotten the job.
we are really evaluating sentences like
(22) I thought that the keys might have been in the drawer.
(23) We will interview everyone who we will think might have gotten the job.
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Then we could say, as Abusch (1997) and Hacquard (2006) do, that it is the atti-
tude verb that shifts the time of the modal, not tense. So perhaps we can explain
apparent tense-shifting, while still denying the key assumption in my statement of
the puzzle.9
But this account makes exactly the wrong predictions in predictable forgetting:
allowing tacit attitude verbs overgenerates felicitous future ‘might’s. In Keys on
Monday, Alice cannot say
(3) #Tomorrow (I’ll look in my bedroom because) the keys might be on the night-
stand.
But she can say
(24) Tomorrow I will think the keys might be on the nightstand.
If we countenance elided attitudes, this contrast is puzzling. Why is there no elided
attitude in (3)? After all, if it were interpreted this way, it would not be marked, but
perfectly intelligible.
And there is no obvious reason why elision should happen in von Fintel and
Gillies’s cases as well as Shortlist but not cases like Keys. In both kinds of cases,
speakers are heard as trying to explain past or future actions in terms of what they
know at the time; but in only one of them are they successful. The elision strat-
egy gives no insight as to why this should be. The elision idea doesn’t dissolve
the puzzle; indeed, the puzzle is evidence against the elision approach in the first
place.10
Before moving to my proposal, I want to address the reasons that are taken to
motivate skepticism about tense shifting. In Hacquard (2006) and Hacquard (2011)
9Hacquard (2011) suggests apparent tense shifting is due to a tacit, modal base-shifting ‘because’.
But in (18) and (19), there is nowhere to put the ‘because’ that gets right reading.
10Another issue is the following contrast:
(i) a. I thought the keys might have been in the drawer and I was right: they might have been.
b. I thought the keys might have been in the drawer and I was right: # I thought they might
have been.
The elision approach predicts no contrast here.
9
it is noted that certain sentences seem to lack the expected tensed readings. Take:
(25) Mary must have taken the train.
(26) Tomorrow Marikos might be dead.
Out of the blue, the only epistemic reading of (25) is one which talks about our
present knowledge; and it is hard to get any epistemic reading of (26). Likewise
it is hard to get epistemic readings when modals are embedded under temporal
adverbials:
(27) #Usually Mary might take the train.
Hacquard and others think that the absence of such readings is readily explained if
we say tense is barred from ever shifting the relevant knowledge.11
But what about a pragmatic explanation? If the syntax and semantics of modals
are supposed to explain the data, we should not expect to see similar data for knowl-
edge attributions. But note that even tensed knowledge attributions can sound odd
out of the blue. Consider for instance:
(28) Q. How did Mary leave town?
a. [A.] ?? I knew she took the train.
(29) ?? Tomorrow I won’t know whether Marikos is dead.
Without context, both sentences sound odd. We notice the same pattern with tem-
poral adverbials:
(30) ??Usually I don’t know whether Mary will take the train.
There is a natural explanation of these data: without context, it’s hard to see why
anything other than our current ones would be relevant. When we are wondering
how Mary left town or whether Marikos is dead, why care about what I knew in the
past or will know in the future?
This explanation naturally extends to modals. We search for readings of (25)
11Note also these data hold only for the auxiliaries ‘might’ and ‘must’ and not ‘it is possible’. But
my data include epistemic ’possible’ too.
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and (26) that aren’t just true but also relevant. Since the missing readings are irrel-
evant, we do not select them. And when context makes clear why other knowledge
states would be relevant, those shifted readings should appear. This is exactly what
we observe: our prima facie cases of shifting are precisely cases that make clear
why other knowledge states would be relevant.
Our original observations do not derive from some general problem about com-
bining epistemic modals and tense. Tense can scope above epistemic modals. It just
does not always produce the results we would expect.
4 An Interval-Based Solution
I now give a semantic solution to our puzzle. I give a new kind of modal base to
predict our three observations.
4.1 The modal base
I make two innovations to how modal bases work.
First, I replace Evidence with
History. ⌜might φ⌝ is true at a world w and time t iff φ is compatible
with all the evidence acquired in w in the relevant interval before and
up to t.
Instead of simply collecting together the propositions that make up the agent’s ev-
idence at a given time, as Evidence does, epistemic modal bases will also collect
those propositions at times within a certain interval before the input time. Thus,
while epistemic modals still have something to do with the evidence of the rele-
vant agents, they can also come apart from that evidence as we go forward in time.
(Again, in our cases the only relevant evidence is what the agent knows, so I will
treat evidence and knowledge as interchangeable.)
Second, I give a theory about which intervals are relevant. I say the relevant
interval starts with the most recent episode of information loss. Given a time t,
define It, which we’ll call a partial history, as follows:
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(31) It = {t′ ∶ either t < t′ or t′ < t and t′ is not earlier than the most recent
episode of information loss to relative to t.}
Intuitively, to construct a partial history for a given t, we take an agent’s entire his-
tory and remove the part before the most recent (relative to t) episode of information
loss.12
The modal base is defined relative to a partial history. Where Itc is the partial
history corresponding to the time of the context c:
(32) (Partial History)
Bc(w, t) = {p: the relevant agent knows p at some t′ where t′ ≤ t and
t′ ∈ Itc}
(The output of the modal base at w and t is the set of propositions known
in w at any point in Itc up to t)
When fed a time t (and worldw), an epistemic modal base delivers the set of propo-
sitions known at times up to t (inw) in the partial history Itc . In other words, modal
bases collect the facts known within a given partial history up until t. To find the
domain of quantification⋂Bc(w, t) we find all the propositions known at any time
in Itc before t and intersect that set.
Note two important features of this account. First, the modal base is monotonic:
when t′ is later than t, if p is in the modal base at t then it must also be in the modal
base at t′. So the set of epistemic possibilities cannot grow as time passes.
Second, moving between partial histories introduces a context-shift. When-
ever information is lost, the relevant partial history changes; and since the modal
bases are anchored to partial histories, the modal base changes, too. And this seems
right. Were the context not to shift, information would continue to accumulate in
the modal base across contexts of utterance even though the relevant agents do not
have access to it. This is undesirable: the more time passes, the fewer epistemic
modal claims an agent would be justified in making. (I would not, for instance, be
justified in telling you that on this day a year ago, I might have eaten cornflakes for
12Really this should be the most recent episode of relevant forgetting. We don’t want, say, Alice’s
forgetting what she had for breakfast to trigger a context-shift. At a first pass, a relevant proposition
is a (partial) answer to a question under discussion (in the sense of Roberts (1996)).
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breakfast, for I know my past knowledge settles the matter one way or the other!)
If the modal base collects what is known from some point closer to the context of
utterance, context-shifting solves the problem.
4.2 Predictions
Now recall our case:
Keys. On Monday night, Alice leaves her keys in the kitchen. But
she always forgets where she has left the keys overnight. In fact, she
can foresee that tomorrow morning she will go looking for them in her
bedroom.
Alice says
(3) #Tomorrow I’ll look in my bedroom because the keys might be on the night-
stand.
Keeping the semantics from earlier, we still have:
(15) JFUT might φKc,w,t = 1 iff ∃t′ ∶ t < t′ ∶ ∃w′ ∈ ⋂Bc(w, t′) ∶ JφKc,w′,t′ = 1.
LetBMonday be the modal base supplied by Monday’s context of utterance. To eval-
uate (3), we need to see whether ⋂BMonday(w, tTuesday) contains worlds where
the keys are on the nightstand.
Partial History tells us that BMonday(w, tTuesday) contains all propositions
known by Alice at any time in Monday’s partial history up until Tuesday. Since she
knows on Monday that the keys are in the kitchen, BMonday(w, tTuesday) contains
the proposition that the keys are in the kitchen. In Monday’s context,⋂BMonday(w, tTuesday),
the domain for the modal evaluated at Tuesday will not contain worlds where the
keys are on the nightstand. So (3) is false. Moreover, Alice’s semantic knowledge,
together with her knowledge of the case, guarantees that she knows (3) is false.
Hence (3) is marked. This explains Observation 1.
We also rightly predict that Alice’s knowledge only gets carried forward. Con-
sider again:
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Keys on Monday Again. On Monday night Alice’s partner asks her
what she was doing rummaging around in their bedroom the previous
morning. Alice was in fact looking for the keys, which her partner had
placed in the living room.
Alice says
(10) Yesterday I looked in our bedroom because the keys might have been there.
Again, we give past ‘might’-claims the following semantics:
(16) JPAST might φKc,w,t = 1 iff ∃t′ ∶ t′ < t ∶ ∃w′ ∈ ⋂Bc(w, t′) ∶ JφKc,w′,t′ = 1.
To see whether (10) is true, we need to see whether for some time t on Sunday⋂B(w, tSunday) contains worlds where the keys are in the bedroom.
Partial History predicts that it will. B(w, tSunday) will contain just the propo-
sitions known by Alice up until Sunday (within Monday’s partial history). Until
the point at which she found them, Alice did not know where the keys were. So⋂B(w, tSunday) will contain worlds where the keys were in the bedroom. Hence
(10) is true. This explains Observation 3.
Partial History predicts the asymmetry brought out by Observations 1 and 3
precisely because it is monotonic: past information is carried forward, but future
information is not carried backwards. (This feature will be shared by any History-
based view.)
Finally, we want to explain the contrast between what Alice can say on Monday
and what she can say on Tuesday. Consider the continuation of the case:
Keys on Tuesday Alice wakes up on Tuesday morning and has indeed
forgotten where the keys are. She goes looking for them upstairs.
We noted Alice can now say
(9) The keys might be on the nightstand.
We predict this by appeal to partial histories. Since something is forgotten
overnight, different partial histories correspond to Monday and Tuesday, soBMonday
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will be different from BTuesday. Moreover, since on Tuesday Alice does not know
where the keys are, BTuesday(w, tTuesday) will not contain the proposition that the
keys are in the kitchen. So ⋂BTuesday(w, tTuesday) will contain worlds where the
keys are on the nightstand. Thus, (9) as said by Alice on Tuesday is true and as-
sertable. This explains Observation 2.
On my proposal, modal bases are monotonic within a context, but not across
contexts. This is why we predict the contrast between what Alice can say on Monday
and on Tuesday but also the asymmetry between past and future ‘might’-claims.13
13A referee asks about cases where both the learning and the forgetting are predictable, like the
following: I will learn this evening whether aliens landed at Roswell; but my memory will be wiped
by the men in black overnight. Consider:
(i) Tomorrow morning it will be possible that aliens landed at Roswell and it will be possible
that they didn’t.
I predict that this is marked: either the proposition that they landed at Roswell or its negation will be
in my future modal base.
I think this is the right prediction, but I grant that the intuitions are less clear here. To bolster my
intuition, note that the judgements are clearer if the discourse highlights the information loss.
(ii) Either I’ll forget that they landed at Roswell or I’ll forget that they didn’t land at Roswell. #
On Tuesday morning, it’ll be true that the aliens might have landed in Roswell and that they
they might not have.
Similarly, we are reluctant to describe ourselves as knowing either of these future ‘might’s:
(iii) #Tomorrow morning, I’ll know that the aliens might have landed in Roswell and I’ll know that
they might not have.
This is puzzling, if they are indeed true. Empirical investigation could be illuminating here; but
hopefully these data make my predictions seem plausible.
The referee floats an alternative proposal, whereby the modal base just unions the information at
the future time and the information at the context of utterance. This would correctly predict that future
‘might’s are marked in cases like Keys, as well as having the (possible) benefit of predicting that (i)
is true.
The data above aside, I think it will be difficult to spell out this proposal in a way that both predicts
and explains the past/future asymmetry. The simplest general formulation of the view is thatBc(w, t)
unions together the information at w and t and the information at the context c. But then information
in the context should also get carried into past ‘might’s and so we do not predict Observation 3. A
different view might say that if t is earlier than the time of the context, thenBc(w, t) contains just the
information atw and t; otherwise, it also includes the information in c. This does predict Observation
3, but basically by stipulation. History derives this from more general properties of the modal base.
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5 Problems of Context
Now for two objections, one about the judgements in Keys on Monday and one
about monotonicity. My answers to both exploit the connection between time and
the context-sensitivity of ‘might’.
5.1 Felicitous Future ‘Might’s?
There is a wrinkle in the data around Observation 1. Some report that we can
improve future ‘might’s by tying them more explicitly to an explanation of our future
behaviour. For example, as a referee points out, sentences like (6) and (7) may sound
better than those without the ‘because’.14
Now, this is not a reason to think future ‘might’s are fine in cases of predictable
forgetting. Even if (6) and (7) are better, sentences like (3) – (5) and (8) are still
marked in Keys. But there certainly is something to be explained. I argue these
judgements track a second, less prominent reading of a future ‘might’, a new kind
of exocentric reading.
Exocentric readings are ones where ‘might’ does not have its default interpre-
tation, but rather latches onto the information of some third party. Take a case from
Egan et al. (2005):
The Bus: My friend Sally is avoiding Tara. Sally is on a bus and,
worried that Tara might board it, goes to hide at the back. I’m watching
all this from some nearby bushes but can see that Tara is not in fact on
the bus.
On seeing Sally’s behaviour, I explain to a companion:
(33) Sally is hiding because Tara might be on that bus.
(33) is true, even though I clearly know that Tara isn’t on the bus. I am rather using
‘might’ to express what it normally does in Sally’s mouth.
14In my experience this opinion is not unanimous; hence, my original hash-mark. But for most, an
improved reading is possible if enough contextual pressure is applied.
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We get evidence for thinking the good readings of sentences like (6) and (7) are
exocentrics by noting that they appear and disappear in some of the same contexts
as exocentrics. Exocentrics tend to require explanatory contexts. In The Bus, I
cannot simply turn my attention to Sally and say
(34) #Tara might be on that bus.15
The ‘because’ is necessary to elicit the exocentric reading. This is one point of
similarity: the improved (6) and (7) explicitly involve some explanation; the marked
(3) – (5) and (8) do not.
But even in explanatory contexts, certain continuations block exocentrics. Sup-
pose instead of just (33) I say:
(35) Sally is hiding because she thinks Tara might be on that bus; # and indeed
Tara might be.
The continuation, ‘indeed Tara might be’ is marked here. But then the second
‘might’ cannot be exocentric. I would be saying that Sally thinks that Tara’s be-
ing on the bus is compatible with her evidence and that her belief is correct. But
this is true and relevant. Presumably instead the ‘might’ here has its default reading,
which makes the continuation false.
Now consider what happens when future ‘might’s occur in these environments.
Suppose that Alice says:
(36) Tomorrow I’ll look in my bedroom because I’ll think the keys might be on
the nightstand. #And indeed that will be one of the places they might be.
Like in (35), the material following ‘indeed’ is marked. Again, we see a parallel
with exocentrics.
My theory explains how (6) and (7) could be exocentric. Exocentrics arise when
we interpret ‘might’ as it would normally be used in other contexts. Alice’s future-
self is not literally a third party, but it does occupy a different context: Alice will
occupy a different partial history and so her ‘might’ will mean something different
15Pace Egan et al. (2005)’s own presentation.
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then. This will be a meaning for exocentrics to target; and since that reading will
be true, a present exocentric ‘might’ would be true now.
5.2 Monotonicity violations in the past?
My account is fully monotonic: modal bases are monotonic from any time forward.
But one might wonder whether we really want monotonicity in the past.
Return to Keys on Monday. Suppose that Alice has woken up and remembers
that she either knew the keys were in the living room or that they were in the kitchen.
She says
(37) a. Either the keys had to be in the kitchen or the keys had to be in the
living room.
b. But now they could be in either place.
This speech sounds true. But my proposal says that if (37-a) is true, then (37-b)
should be false. For what was necessary remains necessary. Even worse, I predict
the modal base for (37-a) is empty: since yesterday falls outside Alice’s current
partial history, no proposition known then will be in the modal base. So the domain
of the modal will include all possible worlds and each disjunct of (37-a) is false.
A revised fully monotonic account can predict these data. First, define our
modal bases as follows: where I is a partial history
BI(w, t) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
{p: there’s a time t′ not later than t s.t. t′ ∈ I and p is known at t′}, if t is in or later than I;
undefined, otherwise.
Now, when the modal base is supplied a time before the relevant partial history, it
will be undefined.
Next tweak the account of how the modal base is supplied. Instead of just se-
lecting the modal base corresponding to the smallest partial history the context is
in, we select the smallest partial history that alsomakes the utterance defined. More
formally:
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(38) (Defined Partial History)
Where Ic is the smallest partial history containing tc and that makes the
utterances in c defined, Bc = BIc
We take the partial history starting with the most recent episode of information loss
and if the utterance is defined against the corresponding modal base, we use that
one. If not, we move on to the next episode of information loss and try again. And
so on.
Now return to (37-a). The smallest partial history that makes Alice’s utterance
defined is the smallest one that includes yesterday. And yesterday she knew where
the keys were. So when fed a time from yesterday, the corresponding modal base
will contain either the proposition that the keys are in the kitchen or that they are in
the living room. Since that is the interval we are quantifying over, (37-a) is true.
To predict (37-b) I say (37-b) is interpreted in a different context to (37-a). This
is because (37-b) is uttered after (37-b) and contexts include their times. In the
(37-b)’s utterance context, the partial history which stops at Alice’s most recent
forgetting makes (37-b) defined. But this does not include yesterday’s forgotten
information. So (37-b) is true.
This kind of temporal context-shift is not ad hoc, but rather independently re-
quired. Consider a discourse like this:
(39) Alice is sitting down. Now she’s standing up. Now she’s sitting down
again.
Here ‘now’ does not pick out the same time throughout. Here too the natural thought
is that, because each utterance takes place in its own temporally distinct context,
each ‘now’ picks out a different time.16
The example can be explained away; but why not instead opt for a partially
monotonic solution, where modal bases are only monotonic from the context-time
onwards? After all, this would predict (37-a) and (37-b) to be true without any
subtle manoeuvring.
16This assumes neither a Kaplanian semantics (Kaplan (1989)) nor an anaphoric semantics for
‘now’ (Hunter (2012) and Altshuler (2016)).
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The trouble is I do not know how to generate this kind of monotonicity in a
principled way. We could write it in by hand into our modal bases, but we should
ask for more than this. My account gives a principled explanation of the full mono-
tonicity property. And so I think adopting Defined Partial History is worth the
cost to simplicity.
6 A New Picture
We have solved my puzzle with monotonicity and context-shifting. I now conclude
by considering some bigger picture upshots for the distinction between epistemic
and historical modality, noting that, on my view, the two are more similar than
typically thought.17
Consider
(40) It hasn’t been decided yet who will get the job. Alex might get it and so
might Billy.
The ‘might’ here has a historical (or circumstantial) reading, where talks about
what is possible given the relevant facts. On this reading, the truth of (40) depends,
not on what we know, but on what holds in the world more generally. These readings
are generated by historical modal bases like the following:18
(41) B(w, t) = {p ∶ p is a proposition about an interval that does not extend
past t and p is true at w.}
Notice that, as stated in (41), historical modality will be monotonic. This is
no accident. Among other things, Thomason (1984) and Condoravdi (2002) note
this captures an important asymmetry between past and future: once something
becomes settled it remains settled; but what lies in the future can remain open. For
example, suppose that it rains at time t. Before t, it was historically possible that
it would not rain at t. But once we get to t and it in fact does rain, it is no longer
17See for instance, Kratzer (1991) and Williamson (forthcoming). This also seems implicit in
recent expressivist theories, such as Yalcin (2011) and Moss (2018).
18This is Khoo (2015)’s formulation.
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be historically possible for it to have not rained at t. What was possible in the past
becomes historically impossible from t onwards.
We now have two asymmetries in time, one epistemic and one historical. It
is surprising that both kinds of modal base should have this property, especially if
there is a sharp distinction here. Why would both core flavours of modality have an
open future but a settled past?
One avenue to explore is that epistemic modality is actually a circumscribed
form of historical modality. φ is historically possible in a world at a time t iff φ
is compatible with the relevant facts in that world that hold up to and including
t. We might say that φ is epistemically possible at t just in case it is compatible
with the facts about the evidence in a given partial history up to and including t.
Thus, instead of being a distinct form of modality, epistemic modality would be
a subspecies of historical modality, one that limits itself to facts about particular
partial histories. Spelled out, we would have
Historical: Jmight φKc,w,t = 1 iff φ is compatible with the facts in w
about the evidence in the relevant interval up to t.
This reduces the two asymmetries to one. The monotonicity property of histori-
cal modals accounts for the difference between past and future in both the epistemic
and the historical cases. The epistemic asymmetry that this paper is about would
just be a special case of the more familiar asymmetry between past and future.
Clearly, much more would need to be said before Historical could be accepted;
epistemic modals are thought to be special in a variety of ways. But it would give
a satisfying explanation of why epistemic modals have the monotonicity proper-
ties needed to solve my puzzle; and this, I think, should make it worthy of future
investigation.
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